What the UK can rely on
NATO
The UK is one of three nuclear powers in the alliance and a principal contributor of deployable capability. It spent 2.3% of GDP on defence in 2024 against a target of 3.5% on core defence by 2035, with staged commitments in between: a credible path on paper, most of it falling beyond this Parliament, and questioned by independent analysts on affordability.
Spending against the agreed target
60/100 · 25% weight
NATO members agreed in July 2025 to reach 5% of GDP by 2035: 3.5% on core defence and 1.5% on related security. The UK spent 2.3% in 2024 and has committed to 2.5% by 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 3.5% by 2035. On the core measure the UK is on a stated path to the target; it is not there yet, and the later commitments fall beyond this Parliament.
Operational contribution
75/100 · 25% weight
The UK remains one of the alliance's principal contributors of deployable capability, and its own naval activity around UK waters (116 Royal Navy activations in 2025–26) is conducted as part of that posture.
Alliance cohesion
50/100 · 20% weight
Public criticism of allies by the US administration over the Iran conflict, and questions raised about the UK specifically, are a strain on cohesion at the political level even where military integration is unaffected.
Nuclear contribution
80/100 · 15% weight
The UK is one of the alliance's three nuclear powers and the deterrent is committed to NATO. This is the most stable element of the UK's contribution and the least sensitive to the year's politics.
Delivery against the Strategic Defence Review
55/100 · 15% weight
The Strategic Defence Review set out capability ambitions on the argument that they can be delivered within the planned spending increase. Independent analysis has questioned whether the money covers the commitments. Stated intent is clear; delivery is not yet demonstrated.