What the UK can rely on
United States
The split runs down the middle of this one. Intelligence sharing and the nuclear and defence-industrial relationship are treaty-based and appear unaffected; trade terms are conditional and have been publicly threatened, and the President has criticised the UK's military and policies directly. The parts held together by institutions are holding; the parts held together by politics are not.
Intelligence sharing
85/100 · 25% weight
The Five Eyes partnership remains the deepest and most institutionalised part of the relationship, and continued to operate jointly through 2026 — the partners issued a joint bulletin on Chinese intelligence recruitment in June 2026. Nothing in the public record suggests the political friction below has reached it.
Defence and nuclear ties
80/100 · 20% weight
The nuclear and defence-industrial relationship is treaty-based and long-run, and is the part of the partnership least exposed to a change of administration.
Trade terms
45/100 · 20% weight
The Economic Prosperity Deal agreed in May 2025 capped most additional US tariffs on UK goods at 10% and gave relief on steel and cars. In 2026 the President warned that the deal could be torn up. A deal that exists but is publicly conditional is worth less than one that is settled.
Political alignment
30/100 · 20% weight
The President has criticised NATO allies over Iran and singled out the UK, denigrating its military and its domestic and foreign policies and questioning its loyalty. Rhetoric is not policy, but sustained public criticism from the head of the allied government is a real cost to the relationship and is scored as one.
Operational alignment
45/100 · 15% weight
The UK declined to join offensive US and Israeli action against Iran in late February 2026, then provided defensive support for UK bases and allies in the region from early March. Divergence on the offensive question, convergence on defence of shared assets.